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Little is known about the potential of indigenous software activities in CEE 
countries. The paper outlines positive developments and challenges before indigenous 
software activities and disentangles the variety of factors influencing development of 
indigenous software industries in Bulgaria and with a reference to CEE. Based on a 
survey data about capabilities accumulation in the Bulgarian software companies and 
further analysis of the external factors influencing development of indigenous 
software industries, the study identifies a new phase of development in the indigenous 






Technological development in the EU reveals a multiple-tier structure with 
Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) occupying the middle and lower ends (Radosevic, 
2004). Thus enhancing technological development in CEE remains a major challenge 
before the region. So far technological development in CEE has been driven by 
technological transfer from MNEs, and it has been accepted that indigenous 
development in CEE was and still is totally dependent on foreign technological 
transfer and does not possess a potential to generate technologies on its own. 
However, some low capital but high skill and knowledge intensive industries may 
present opportunities for indigenous developments.  
The case of the software industry has often being cited as an industry offering 
a ‘window of opportunities’ for latecomer countries (Soete, 1985; Steinmueller, 
2001). It has been stressed that the availability of skilful human capital creates a solid 
base for development of an IT industry by the latecomers. The software industry is, in principle, low-capital but knowledge and skill-intensive industry, and the international 
market for software is big and growing (OECD, 2004; Steinmueller, 2004). Further, 
the software industry possesses a potential to generate high rates of growth and spur 
economic development in the latecomers (Kuznets, 1957). For these reasons, the 
discussion about developing indigenous software industries in the latecomer context 
has gained particular attention both in academic and policy literature for more than a 
decade (Schware, 1989, 1992; Soete, 1985; Steinmueller, 2001; UNIDO, 1988).  
Development of ITs in CEE has been identified as a priority by the EU 
(Clements, 2003; IPTS Report, 2003). Statistics shows that the enrolment ratio in 
science and engineering in CEE was and remains higher than the EU average
2. In the 
early 1990es it has been often stated that high potential exists for development of 
indigenous software industries in CEE, due to outstanding skills in fundamental 
research and mathematics (Katkalo and Mowery, 1996). But development of the 
indigenous software industries in CEE in 1990es remained modest and did not 
generate internationally recognised industry, as the fundamental technological 
changes in the global software industry in 1990es found the CEE software engineers 
unprepared (Bitzer, 2000). According to Bitzer (2000) the catching up process in the 
CEE software industry was and still is based on foreign technology transfer.  
Little is known about the potential of indigenous software activities in CEE 
countries. Studies exploring the development of the software industries in the CEE 
have been scarce and predominantly focussing on the restructuring of the industry and 
the emergence of new private enterprises. Very few of the studies, however, have 
been exploring the issue of technological development of these industries. The most 
elaborate amongst them are Bitzer (2000) and Dyker (1996), and (Katkalo, 1996). 
Investigating the development of the software industry in CEE, Dyker (1996) and Bitzer (2000) give similar assessment and yet share slightly different views about 
potential for further development. Although Dyker does not rule out indigenous-led 
development completely, he outlines that its chances to flourish are low, due to 
relatively poor accumulation of ICT skills during the command economy period and 
the chance of inherited concentrations of human capability to be quickly dissipated in 
the absence of appropriate social and commercial structures (Dyker, p. 3). The author 
emphasises that the software industries in CEE can grow and develop further only if 
they manage to plug themselves in the global networks, and the examples provided by 
the author refer mostly to foreign-led software companies in the region or indigenous 
companies that have managed to plug themselves in the global production networks.  
Bitzer (2000) provides a comprehensive and in-depth assessment of the 
development of the software industry in CEE. In the course of the analysis he stresses 
that the indigenous software companies prevail in some segments in the domestic 
markets in CEE (segments of low standartisation, adapted software, small-scale 
custom software projects, and installation, implementation and training), due to their 
advantage in cost, knowledge of the language and personal contacts. Nevertheless, the 
author stresses that the share of the indigenous companies is to shrink in time, as 
customers’ preferences will shift towards standardised software solutions and in these 
segments the foreign MNEs are likely to prevail. Likewise it is unlikely that the CEE 
software products will gain share in the international markets, according to the author. 
The study emphasises that the CEE software companies are confronted by a number 
of obstacles (e.g. the small size of indigenous CEE companies and the limited 
resources they possess, small domestic markets which does not provide a platform for 
development of complex and costly products and large scale custom projects, 
domination of Western MNEs in the segment of standardised products, etc.), which will prevent them to successfully develop standardised products both for domestic and 
international markets.  
Both authors point (although to a different extent) that the indigenous software 
industries in CEE will be challenged by the international competition. In this sense, it 
is worthwhile to assess in quantitative and comparative way the capabilities, which 
the indigenous software companies possess to compete in domestic and international 
markets, which has not been done to the moment and is the focus of this study. This 
paper explores the development of capabilities for software production in the 
domestic and international markets in an indigenous CEE software industry by taking 
the case of the Bulgarian software industry.  
Although the results of the analysis are valid only for Bulgaria, they will allow 
us to point some issues, which are likely to hold for the CEE and are worthwhile to be 
verified by further studies. Following the analysis of capabilities accumulation the 
paper disentangles external factors that influence the development of indigenous 
software industries. The aim of the paper is to raise the issue of capability building in 
the indigenous software companies in CEE, outline positive developments and 
challenges before it (based on the Bulgarian case) and disentangle the variety of 
factors influencing development of indigenous software industries in CEE. This 
enquiry is positioned in the broader topic and continuing debate about the possibilities 
for developing indigenous software industries in a less-advanced context.  
The paper is structured as follows: the following section lays down the 
theoretical framework of the research, by discussing the concept of capabilities 
building and the specifics in applying it to the case of the software industry. Section 
three makes an overview of the development of the Bulgarian software industry. 
Section four presents the methodology and the results of the research about capabilities accumulation in the Bulgarian software industry. Section five disentangles 
external factors that influence development of latecomer indigenous software 
industries in CEE. The final section draws conclusions and policy implications, and 
directions for further research. 
 
2. Theoretical framework 
The recent spectacular outbursts of software development activities 
undertaken by indigenous software industries in a number of developing countries, 
like India, China and Brazil, have attracted particular attention for research (see for 
example among many others, for all latecomer countries (Arora, 2005; Carmel, 2003; 
Heeks, 2002; Minevich, 2005), for India (Arora, 2001; Athreye, 2005; Tschang, 
2001), for China (Tschang, 2005), for China vs. India (Contractor, 2004; Tschang, 
2003), for Brazil (Botelho, 2005). Although very few latecomer companies have 
managed to enter the international markets for software and related services, the 
relative success of India, China and Brazil (Arora, 2001; Athreye, 2005; Botelho, 
2005; Tschang, 2005) has amplified the need to examine the contribution of 
capabilities as well as other factors to entry and development
3.  
In its seminal work Schware (1989) analyses the development of the world 
software industry at the time and potential niches, which could be exploited by the 
latecomers. He argues that development of the world software industry offers viable 
opportunities for the latecomers to harness the potential of software development 
activities, and identifies areas of software development activities, which can be 
entered on the basis of good basic if not highly sophisticated software expertise. Thus, 
the availability of skills and capabilities adequate to the requirements of the world industry is the major challenge, which the latecomers face in developing software 
industries with indigenous resources.  
Later works of Correa (1996), Steinmueller (2001) and Heeks (2002) had 
picked up the argument and elaborated it further. Steinmueller (2001) and Heeks 
(2002) had undertaken a detailed analysis of the factors influencing the process of 
capabilities building in the latecomers. Steinmueller (2001) emphasises that modern 
IT infrastructures allow latecomers to access information and knowledge and 
subsequently develop absorptive capacities and capabilities for software 
developments on their own. According to the author these create viable possibilities 
before the latecomers to enter the world software industry based on indigenous 
resources.  
On the basis of detailed analysis of the enabling forces underlying the 
successful development of the software industries in the latecomer context, Heeks 
(2002) constructs a model of software export success for developing and transition 
countries. In it he outlines the elements, which the latecomers need to develop and 
mobilise in order to successfully develop export-oriented latecomer software 
industries. According to the model the fundament for developing a latecomer software 
industry is the establishment of National Software-Related Infrastructure, comprising 
of skilful human resources, technological base, finance, R&D, etc. The author asserts, 
however, that the latecomers’ efforts need to go beyond these, and to involve 
development of a common national base. This involve development of a National 
Software Industry on the base of clusters, competition and collaboration among 
companies, which is based and backed up by National Software Vision, shared and 
supported both by the government and the industry. Once the national base is 
established on the strength of these three national elements, the success of the industry depends on its links with the international markets and trust. The salient feature of the 
model is its explicit emphasis on the interrelatedness of multiple factors and the 
critical importance of establishment of a solid national base supported by government 
and industry and active collaboration and trust among companies.  
The examples of successful development of a latecomer software export 
industry had revealed that public policies had a critical role to play in creating a 
favourable environment. Heeks (2002) emphasises that governments in all three 
successful Is (i.e. India, Ireland and Israel) have acted to stimulate the supply of 
working and venture capital to software firms, and have used tax breaks, marketing 
subsidies, grants, loans, legislative updates, and to remove red tape by a combination 
of both liberalisation (less government) and promotional intervention (more 
government). Establishment of high-tech incubators (Israel) and high-tech parks 
(India) have helped to boost industry development.  
It should be underlined, however, that the role of public policies does not 
exhaust only with the provision of abovementioned direct initiatives for the industry. 
As Heeks asserts, a sense of a ‘national project’ is to be established to spur 
collaboration and development of the industry, and to signal commitment. Creating a 
sense of a national project and embarking the whole economy on a learning trajectory 
is critical for the latecomers (Storper, 1998), and public policies have a critical role to 
play. This has been also confirmed by the successful development of the electronics 
industries and rapid technological catch up in East Asia (Amsden, 1989, 2001; Ernst, 
1998; Evans, 1995; Kim, 1992; Lall, 1994, 1996; Wade, 1990). Public support in 
these cases was coupled with tight performance requirements: companies have been 
supported only if they meet certain performance requirements like export intensity at the time of receiving the funding and they have been expected to increase their export 
share and turnover over time.   
If we are to summarise, the literature emphasises that building capabilities is 
the cornerstone in developing a latecomer software industry, and in addition identifies 
other factors, like public policies and cooperation among companies, as important 
drivers in the process. 
Capabilities for software development are difficult to accumulate in a 
latecomer context for two main reasons. First, accumulating technological knowledge 
is a complex process, which requires not only acquisition of codified knowledge but 
also, and more so, development of tacit expertise, i.e. deeper understanding about 
technologies. Second, in order to build capabilities to compete in international 
markets, the latecomers need to develop mastery over an array of highly complex 
skills and abilities, while the knowledge and expertise, which they possess, may be 
rather limited, and thus make the shift challenging, if not impossible. Thus, the 
success in building capabilities depends entirely on the latecomer companies’ 
deliberate efforts to upgrade, although the outcome is not certain.  
The question of what types of capabilities the indigenous software companies 
need to develop and how to assess them remains open in the literature (for critical 
literature review and developing an approach of how to analyse capabilities see 
Rousseva, 2006). For the purposes of this paper the focus will be placed on the main 
capabilities associated with software production, which reveal the technical expertise 
accumulated in the companies. These represent the core capabilities, which latecomer 
companies need to muster, if they are to develop software activities with own 
resources. These are capabilities for: 1) software design, 2) software programming, 3) 
high quality assurance, 4) prompt delivery, 5) capabilities to develop specialised expertise in a particular domain and 6) capabilities to diversify the products and 
services offered.  
 
3. Overview of the development of the Bulgarian software industry  
Bulgarian software industry offers a fruitful base for analysis of the identified 
issues. The Bulgarian software industry is predominantly domestic-owned (although 
in the last few years the industry sees an increase in foreign-owned companies, the 
share of indigenous  companies prevails and is around 85% (Rousseva, 2003; 2005)
4 
and Bulgaria has been developing ICT industries in the past.  
Bulgaria was among the former command countries selected (appointed) to 
develop an ICT industry within the COMECON, along with Russia, Hungary and 
former East Germany. The enrolment ratio in science and engineering is above the EU 
and CEE average
5  and Bulgaria ranked significantly higher than the international 
average in the International Mathematics and Science Study. Bulgaria’s secondary 
education is among the best in the world: 5th in the world in sciences, 11th in 
mathematics (World Bank and The Economist rankings). Further, Bulgarian pupils 
regularly win Olympiads in Mathematics and Bulgarians are among the top university 
students worldwide (2nd in the world in SAT scores). These education potentials have 
been channelled into IT professional certificates. The Global IT IQ Report in 2002 by 
Brainbench Inc. ranks Bulgaria (with 8,844 Certified Professionals) eighth in a 
ranking of the top 10 countries based on number of certified IT professionals. 
Bulgaria ranks third worldwide for the number of certified professionals as a 
percentage of the population.  
Despite skills recognition of the Bulgarian computer engineers the country has 
not been able to develop big and internationally renowned IT industry. The Bulgarian software industry remains predominantly domestically oriented and only a small 
percentage of the companies operate in international markets. The industry reveals a 
clear ‘bifurcation’ pattern with respect to its export intensity: around 80% operates 
only in the domestic market, while the rest of the companies work predominantly in 
the international markets, and very few companies position in the middle of the scale.  
Furthermore, most of the companies that are involved actively in exporting had 
entered the international markets straight from the very beginning, without serving the 
domestic market beforehand, as previous studies based on a survey and interviews 
revealed (Rousseva, 2001, 2005).  
In the domestic market the indigenous software companies provide the whole 
range of software activities, like system integration, computer system software, 
networking software and web-design, CAD/CAM/CAE software, intermediate 
telecommunications and wireless development software, application software, 
firmware. The high segment of domestic-oriented software activities involves creation 
of ERP systems, B2B and B2C solutions, document flow and project management 
solutions, CAD/CAM/CAE software, intermediate telecommunications and wireless 
development software, customized services, etc. For example, the human resource and 
payroll system HeRMeS developed by Technologica; B2C retail application and 
development of billing and customer support solution for telecoms EyeBill Interactive 
by Sirma; human resource and payroll systems and project management solutions by 
Fadata, ERP system of LKlass, etc. The domestic-oriented companies dominate in the 
segment of accounting software packages. Further, Technologica, a leading domestic-
oriented company, has developed a military information system for National 
Codification Instrument for the Bulgarian Ministry of Defence, which was highly 
recognised and certified by NATO. Some of the domestic-oriented companies had already attempted entering the international markets but these remain with no or 
moderate success. Very few domestic-oriented companies succeeded to enter the 
international markets and these are usually markets in neighbouring countries in South 
Eastern Europe and their export intensity remains around 5%. The low segment of 
domestic-oriented activities entails customization and localization, data migration, 
system integration, etc. 
In the international markets the Bulgarian companies undertake significantly 
narrower range of software activities: some companies are outsourcing and few 
companies succeeded to enter the international arena by offering their own products 
and customised services. The inception of software outsourcing activities in Bulgaria 
begun in late 1990es and although the years of 2000 and 2001 saw some upsurge, 
their presence drastically dropped after 2002. The remaining outsourcing activities 
executed by indigenous Bulgarian software companies at the moment remain little and 
appear to be undertaken by companies with well-established contacts with big 
multinational companies. The activities of the rest of the exporters deserve particular 
attention. Despite their small number, a group of Bulgarian companies have managed 
to develop products or customised services and to introduce them successfully in the 
international markets. Their revenue and market share is rapidly growing and signals 
that these indigenous companies possess significant technological potential. Examples 
for these are Sirma, which had developed a CAD/CAM software package for 
automatisation of the paper and pulp industry called EngView, project management 
solution WorkLogic, linguistic tools Ontotext and development of billing and 
customer support solution for telecoms EyeBill Interactive Solutions; Fadata with its 
software insurance package INSIS and ERP systems, Efficient Systems with its project and document management packages, Antipodes with its workflow package, 
Bianor with its e-learning solutions, etc. 
The revenue of the software industry in Bulgaria
6 reveals a stable increase 
throughout the 1990es and 2000 with 10-30% annual growth
7 but  nevertheless 
remains modest. According to IDG Bulgaria in 2004 the industry had yield nearly 34 
million EURO, which is less than the peak year of 2002 generating 36.3 million but 
nevertheless a recovery after the drop in 2003 (table 1). Industry officials concur with 
these figures and outline that the official figures provided by the National Statistic 
Office are overestimated due to statistical inaccuracy in data compiling.  
 
Revenue from software development (million 
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Table 1. Revenue from software development in Bulgaria (million EURO) 
The issue, which emerges out of this general overview, is what capabilities the 
companies have been able to muster and how these relate to the requirements of the 
international markets? 
Studies exploring the development of the ICT industry in the Bulgaria have 
been scarce and predominantly focussing on the restructuring of the industry and the 
emergence of new private enterprises (ARC Fund, 2002; CED, 2001; ETCO, 1990; 
TACTICS, 2000). Very few studies have been exploring the issues of technological 
development of the industry (Rousseva, 2001, 2003). It is exactly technological 
development and capabilities building that need to become the focal point, if the analyses are to tackle the problems of competitiveness and sustainable growth of the 
indigenous industry. 
 
4. Analysis of the capabilities in the indigenous software industry in 
Bulgaria 
4.1. Methodological note 
The analysis of accumulation of capabilities is directed at comparisons at two 
levels. First, the analysis explores the development of capabilities in the indigenous 
companies, by comparing the level of capabilities accumulation for the domestic and 
international markets. This analysis provides a snapshot of the level of accumulation 
of capabilities in the indigenous companies as compared to the requirements in the 
international markets. Second, to capture differences, which may occur among the 
indigenous companies, the study investigates possible differences between 
domestically-oriented versus export-driven companies. This allows for the analysis to 
reveal the capabilities, which the indigenous companies have managed to muster and 
to unveil possible differences in the accumulation pattern between domestic-oriented 
and exporters, which again can be used as an indicator for capabilities development as 
compared to the requirements in the international markets.  
The analysis is based on a survey conducted in the period September-
November 2004 among 38 leading indigenous software companies. Out of them 78% 
operate only in the domestic market. The rest 22% of the companies have 50% and 
above export intensity (i.e. sales abroad account to 50% and above of the total 
turnover). The group of exporters comprises a diverse set of companies. The biggest 
group, representing 16% of the whole sample are companies having 90% and above export intensity. The rest of the exporters are single or few companies to position in 
the scale between 50-89% export intensity. 
The analysis is based on descriptive statistics and t-test for individual 
capabilities for the level of accumulation of individual capabilities, and ANOVA test 
measuring differences in capabilities accumulation between domestic and exporters 
for every of the identified capabilities for software production in their deployment in 
domestic and international markets. All companies included in the sample are 
companies considering themselves as innovative, i.e. offering new products or 
services
8 . The analysis directed at comparing and contrasting between the 
performance of the domestic-oriented vs. the export-driven companies is undertaken 
in a comparative manner, but the percentages reported refer to the share in the sample 
as a whole, not within the sub-groups.  
 
4.2. Analysis of the capabilities accumulated in domestic-oriented vs. 
export-driven companies 
The assessment of capabilities follows the classification of capabilities for 
software production, in particular, software programming, software design, quality of 
products and services, prompt delivery, specialised expertise in a particular domain, 
and diversified expertise. 
Most of the surveyed companies feel confident that their capabilities for 
software design meet adequately the requirements of the local market, as the mean of 
4.86 reveals. All exporters consider that they have excellent capabilities for software 
design for the needs of the domestic market. The predominant part of the domestic-
oriented companies, representing 64% of the companies in the sample, shares the 
same opinion. While the rest of domestic-oriented companies, comprising 14% of the sample, assess their software design capabilities as very good as compared to the 
needs of the domestic market.  
The difference in the capabilities of the domestic-oriented vs. the export-
driven companies becomes more obvious when assessing the extent to which the 
capabilities for software design allows the companies to compete in the international 
markets. The mean of 3.07 and the mode of 3 reveal that the prevailing number of 
companies considers their capabilities for software design as average as compared to 
the requirements of the international markets. Moreover, this is the only variable 
within the set of the narrow technical capabilities (e.g. capabilities for software 
programming and software design), which appears with a mode lower than 5. Only 
21.6% of the companies assess their capabilities for software design as excellent and 
adequate to respond to challenges in the international markets. These are all exporters, 
while among the domestic-oriented companies only two companies reveal the same 
confidence. Among the exporters the confidence in the excellence in their own 
capabilities prevails, and only two companies find their capabilities as good rather 
then excellent.  
The overall assessment of the software design capabilities of the domestic-
oriented companies is far less optimistic than the exporters. The assessment of the 
capabilities for software design in the international markets for the sub-group of the 
domestic-oriented companies drops down to a mean of 2.4 and a mode of 3, which 
when compared to the mean of 4.75 and mode of 5 for the exporters, provides 
compelling evidence about the divergence in the capabilities for software design 
between the exporters and the domestic-oriented companies. Apart from the two 
companies, which assess their capabilities as excellent, the rest of the domestic-
oriented companies are far less confident and consider that their capabilities for software design are average and below the average, when compared to the 
performance requirements in the international markets. Nearly 30% of the domestic-
oriented companies find that their capabilities for software design are average, when 
compared to the needs of the international markets. Another 29.7% find their 
capabilities as modest, while 13.5% of the companies access their capabilities as poor. 
The fact that only 7.3% of the domestic-oriented companies feel confident that their 
capabilities for software design allow them to compete in international markets, while 
all the rest of the domestic-oriented companies assess their capabilities as average and 
below is revealing and worrying. At this point the gap between the capabilities of 
domestic-oriented companies vs. the exporters begins to unravel. 
Next we focus on the capabilities for software programming. All companies 
are confident that they possess capabilities for software programming, which 
adequately meet the needs of the local market (the mean is 4.92). Only 5.4% of the 
companies consider their capabilities as very good, and these are domestic-oriented 
companies, while all the rest of the companies, both domestic-oriented and exporters 
consider their capabilities for software programming as excellent. Similarly to the 
previous results, most of all Bulgarian software companies feel confident that their 
capabilities reflect adequately the requirements in domestic market. Nevertheless, the 
percentage of companies, which are more confident, is slightly higher, when assessing 
the capabilities for software programming rather then capabilities for software design. 
However, companies’ assessment of whether their software programming 
capabilities are adequate to the requirements in the international markets appears less 
favourable. Although the mode remains 5, the mean of 3.25 reveals that a large 
number of companies possess limited capabilities for software programming to match 
the needs of international clients. Only 22.2% of the companies in the sample consider their capabilities for software programming as excellent for executing international 
projects. All exporters but one believe that their capabilities for software 
programming match perfectly the requirements in the international markets. Among 
domestic-oriented companies there is a single company, which considers itself of 
possessing excellent capabilities for software programming in international projects, 
and the rest of the companies position down the scale: 13.9% very good, 27.8% good, 
and two groups of equal size of 16.7% modest and poor, respectively. Overall, 64% of 
the companies evaluate their capabilities for software programming as average and 
below the average as compared to the needs of international clients, and these are all 
domestic-oriented companies, except one. The domestic-oriented companies appear to 
possess significantly lower capabilities for software programming as compared to the 
requirements in the international markets, which is also indicated by the mean of 2.6 
for this sub-group. These results suggest that a substantial part of the domestic-
oriented companies fail to develop capabilities for software programming, respective 
to the frontier technological development.  
The results provide us with a clear picture of an indigenous software industry, 
in which a limited number of companies possess capabilities for software design, 
which allow them to compete in international markets, while the predominant part of 
the companies (above 70 percent) possess average and below average capabilities for 
software design, which prohibit them from entering the international markets. This 
reveals that the Bulgarian companies face limitations even in the basic technical skills 
and raises concerns about the potential, which the domestic-oriented companies have 
to enter the international markets. Most of the Bulgarian companies appear to have 
limited technical capabilities for competing in the international markets, and the 
capabilities for software design appear to be more problematic than the capabilities for software programming. These results also confirm the existence of a difference in 
the capabilities for software programming between exporters and domestic-oriented 
companies, which we also see with respect to the capabilities for software design.   
The results also raise an interesting point. There has been a wide held belief 
that due to the very good education in mathematics and sciences the East European 
computer engineers possess excellent software programming skills. This belief was 
confronted by studies about development of the software industry in CEE, which 
called for reconsideration of the myth about strong capabilities for software 
programming, which CEE programmers have (Dyker, 1996; Katkalo, 1993). The 
results of our survey show that a significant number of companies (around 64 percent) 
consider themselves of having average and below the average skills in software 
programming, when compared to the international standards. These results evoke 
concerns about the level of education in computer engineering in Bulgaria and the 
extent to which it provides knowledge about the latest technological developments, 
and corroborate with the results of previous studies (Rousseva, 2001; 2005).  
The level of expertise in software engineering and design reflects upon the 
quality of the products and services, designed by the companies. Next we assess the 
confidence, which companies have in the quality of products and services they offer. 
Most of the Bulgarian software companies feel certain about the quality of the 
products and services, which they offer in the domestic market, which reflects in the 
mean of 4.70. The predominant number of the companies feel confident in the 
excellence of the products they offer, except few domestic-oriented companies, 
representing 19.4% of the sample, and only two exporters, comprising 5.6% of the 
whole, which assess the quality of their products and services as very good.  Companies’ assessment about the quality of the products and services they 
offer in the international markets reveals greater heterogeneity. Although the mode 
remains 5, the mean drops down to 3.44. All export-driven companies but one are 
confident in the excellence of the quality of their products and services. While the 
answers of the domestic-oriented companies spread in all categories, from poor to 
excellent quality. Of interest, 19.4% of the companies find that they have a potential 
to offer products and services in the international market with an excellent quality, 
and yet these are companies, which operate only in the domestic market. The 
question, which arises, is whether these companies overstated the confidence in their 
products and services. We need to bear in mind that the assessment is based on 
respondents’ subjective assessment and this may have an impact on the results. 
Respondents may speculate and provide results which put them in a more favourable 
position than the real situation, or they may provide answers, which reflect their 
subjective perception about the situation. Apparently, this holds for this part of the 
assessment, which can be considered as overrated. This group of companies may 
assume that it is capable of producing high quality products and services for the 
international markets. However, as these companies do not actually work in 
international markets, this assessment is more likely to reflect their perception rather 
than the reality.  
Companies themselves assess that they do not possess excellence in software 
programming and design capabilities respective to the requirements in the 
international markets, and therefore it is very unlikely that they have the potential to 
offer high-quality products and services in the international markets. Otherwise, being 
capable of offering high-quality products and services in international markets and 
bidding on their low labour costs advantage, these Bulgarian companies must have at least some level of export intensity. A more realistic treatment of these results would 
be to say that 19.4% of the companies in the sample, which are companies operating 
only in the domestic market, hold high esteem about the products and services they 
offer and perceive their quality to be comparable to similar products in the 
international markets. Another 19.4% of the companies share a completely opposite 
view, assessing the quality of their products as poor compared to the international 
markets’ standards. The rest 33% of the companies position in the middle of the scale.  
These results reveal that domestic-oriented companies form three distinct 
groups, somehow polarised in their assessment about their ability to generate products 
and services with a quality respective to the quality standards in the international 
markets. While some of the companies are highly confident, another group of equal 
number of companies is far negative and a third group position in the middle. 
Nevertheless, the predominant part of the domestic-oriented companies, representing 
55.6% of the companies, consider that the quality of the products and services they 
can offer in international markets is average and below the average. Correcting the 
answers by downgrading the potentially unrealistic high answers will add up extra 
numbers. These results are another indication about the extent to which the domestic-
oriented companies have been successful in building capabilities. The interesting 
point they reveal is that a significant part of the domestic-oriented companies are 
aware of the moderate quality of their products and services and the limitations of 
their own capabilities.  
Promptness in delivery is the next capability to be investigated. The 
predominant part of the companies makes prompt deliveries in the domestic market (a 
mean of 4.53). The exporters appear to perform better than the domestic-oriented 
companies. 75% of the exporters, representing 15.6% of the companies in the sample, point out that meeting deadlines is an integral part of their excellence, while 25% of 
the exporters outline that the promptness of delivery in the domestic market is very 
good rather than excellent. 75% of the domestic-oriented companies, representing 
58.3% of the sample, also reveal excellence in meeting deadlines in the domestic 
market, but the rest of them, representing 11.1% of the sample, are failing to deliver 
on time and consider that they have modest capabilities for prompt delivery in the 
domestic market.  
With respect to deliveries in the international markets companies diverge 
completely. All exporters but one achieve promptness in delivery in the international 
markets. Interestingly enough, some of the exporters allow themselves to be more 
lenient in meeting deadlines while working on projects for the domestic market, while 
they appear to be prompt in the international markets deliveries. This is an interesting 
fact by itself and it has its cultural grounds, as tolerance towards small delays is still 
an inherent part of the Bulgarian business culture. The difference in business cultures, 
and particularly the detrimental effect of lenient towards delays Bulgarian culture, 
becomes more apparent, when analysing the extent to which the domestic-oriented 
companies manage (or would be able to manage) to meet the deadlines in 
international projects. 40% of domestic-oriented companies, comprising 31.4% of the 
whole sample, consider themselves as having excellence in meeting deadlines in 
international projects, while two equal-size groups of domestic-oriented companies, 
each representing 17% of the whole sample, cluster around the two ends of the scale, 
having respectively very good and poor delivery in the international markets, and a 
limited number of companies position in the middle of the scale.  
These results are provoking, as companies currently operating only in the 
domestic market provide answers about their performance in the international markets. The grounds for these are twofold. Some domestic-oriented companies had 
already made attempts to enter the international markets, which obviously were with 
no success, but on these grounds they are able to provide an assessment of their 
capabilities to perform in the international markets. Second, as discussed above, these 
results reflect companies’ subjective perception, and this may differ to an extent from 
the real situation. Further, the lowest score for domestic market is 2, while for 
international is 1. In other words, some of the domestic-oriented companies have 
outlined that they do not possess capabilities for prompt delivery both in domestic and 
international projects, with their skills for meeting the deadlines in international 
projects being lower than in domestic projects.  
This raises serious concerns. It brings back the point about the prevailing 
business culture in Bulgaria. Apparently, those companies, which had adopted a more 
lenient approach towards meeting deadlines in the domestic projects, subsequently 
find it extremely difficult to cope with requirements in the international projects. 
Transition from domestic to export orientation appears to be a cumbersome task, with 
project management skills emerging as one of the hurdles on the way. This comes to 
suggest that even building capabilities for prompt delivery appears to be a problem, 
which the latecomer companies need to tackle. 
Next we look at how companies develop their knowledge base. Companies are 
asked to assess their specialised expertise in a particular domain in the domestic and 
international markets, and the diversification of their expertise.  
Bulgarian companies reveal confidence that they possess specialised 
knowledge and expertise about the local market, which is reflected by the mean of 
4.41. 63.9% of the companies consider their knowledge as excellent, and the rest of 
the companies are equally distributed among answers very good and good. All exporters except two claim that they possess specialised expertise in a particular 
domain in the local market. The other two, however, present an interesting case. One 
of the companies considers itself as having very good expertise, but the other one 
claims that it possesses poor specialised expertise in a particular domain in the local 
market. This represents the only company having no specialised expertise in a 
particular domain in the local market within the whole sample. The reason for this 
perhaps lay in the fact that this company has 90% export intensity and it does not put 
special efforts in developing specialised expertise for the local market.  
The domestic-oriented companies also appear to have developed specialised 
expertise about a particular domain in the domestic markets. 47.2% of them consider 
themselves as having excellent specialised expertise about a particular domain in the 
domestic market, 13.9% very good and 16.7% good respectively. Overall, most of the 
companies had developed specialised expertise about a particular domain in the 
domestic market. When compared to the rest of the variables in the set, there are very 
few answers in the lower end of the scale. Apparently companies perceive it 
mandatory to develop specialised expertise for a particular domain for to be able to 
compete.  
The situation seems rather different when companies evaluate their specialised 
expertise in a particular domain in the international markets. Although the mode 
remains 5, the mean drops down to 3.44. Interestingly enough, the mean, which the 
indigenous software industry attains, for having specialised expertise in a particular 
domain in international markets, is higher than the mean, which the industry obtains 
for its capabilities for software programming and software design in international 
markets. This again, raises concerns about the basic technical capabilities, which the 
indigenous software companies possess. Coming back to the results about the expertise in a particular domain in the 
international markets, the analysis confirms the previous patterns. All exporters have 
managed to develop specialised expertise about a particular domain in international 
markets, whereas the domestic-oriented companies reveal greater divergence. 16.2% 
of the companies, which operate in the domestic market, outline that they possess 
specialised expertise about a particular domain in the international markets. The rest 
of the companies but one are clustered around the average and below average points 
of the scale. 16.2% of the companies consider themselves of having poor specialised 
expertise for a particular domain in the international markets, the rest of companies 
form two groups of 21.6% each by assessing their expertise as good and modest. 
Further, all exporters come up with a mean of 5, while the domestic-oriented 
companies attain a mean of 2.8, which again reflects the difference in the specialised 
expertise in a particular domain in the international markets, which the companies of 
these two major groups have been able to develop. 
The number of companies having specialised expertise in a particular domain 
in the domestic market is 80%, which is considerably greater than the number of 
companies having specialised expertise in a particular domain in the international 
markets, which account to 50%. Perhaps the latter number needs correction 
downwards, as 16% of the companies consider themselves to have specialised 
expertise in a particular domain in the international markets but these are companies 
operating only in the domestic market and therefore, it is not realistic that they have 
adequate expertise to deploy in the international markets. Further, the number of 
companies, which have not been able to accumulate specialised expertise in a 
particular domain, is greater for the international markets than for the domestic one 
(nearly 40% of the indigenous companies consider themselves as having below the average specialised expertise for a particular domain in the international markets). All 
these follow the domestically oriented profile of the industry, and suggest that a 
transition from the domestic to the international markets will be a challenging, if not 
impossible, task for the majority of the companies.  
Finally, we focus on the extent to which the companies have been able to 
diversify the products and services, which they offer in the domestic and international 
markets. This appears to be the least developed capability among all, as both means 
are the lowest within the set. Companies diversify their products and services in the 
domestic market to a great deal, as the mean of 4.11 reveals, whereas they have not 
been successful in diversifying their products and services in the international 
markets, as the mean of 2.64 suggests. 49% of the companies in the sample reveal 
excellent diversification of their products and services in the domestic market, another 
30% - very good and 14% - good diversification. Only 8% of the companies appear to 
have poor diversification of their products and services in the domestic market.  
Unlike the previous variables, this one does not suggest a strong distinction 
between the performance of the domestic-oriented vs. the exporters. The exporters 
occupy the two ends of the scale - 70% of them perform a high level of diversification 
in the domestic market, while the rest reveal poor diversification. Parallel to this, there 
is no clear relation between the export intensity and the level of diversification. 
Nevertheless, a pattern emerges among the exporters. Exporters seem to reveal similar 
levels of diversification in the domestic and international markets, i.e. if an exporter 
has diversified its products and services in the international markets, it applies the 
same level of diversification of its products and services also in the domestic market. 
Respectively, low level of diversification in the international markets is coupled with 
low level of diversification in the domestic market. In contrast, the domestic-oriented companies reveal better diversification in 
the domestic market than in the international markets. 41.7% reveal excellent 
diversification in the domestic market, 22.2% very good and the rest 13.9% good 
diversification. The diversification in the international market differs completely. 
Only 2.7% outline that they have diversified products and services in the international 
markets, while 32.4% have good, 24.3% modest and 16.2% poor diversification. 
These results suggest that companies do attempt to diversify. But they achieve good 
diversification only in markets in which they have the capacity to compete, i.e. they 
have respective capabilities for software programming and software engineering, to 
develop specialised expertise in a particular domain, ability to deliver on time, etc. 
Second, we again face the problem of having answers about performance in the 
international markets by companies, which operate only in the domestic market. In 
this case, we need to consider the answers as reflecting potentials. Some Bulgarian 
companies have made attempts of entering the international markets and these results 
may be considered to reflect the strategy of entering the international markets. 
Overall, the results reveal that Bulgarian companies have rather limited ability to 
diversify products and services, which they eventually would offer in the international 
markets. 
A final point in the analysis of the individual capabilities of the exporters vs. 
the domestic-oriented companies is to be raised with respect to the group of exporters. 
All the exporters reveal excellence in their performance in all the above studied 
capabilities, with a mean of 5. There is only one sub-group of exporters, the 
companies with 90% export intensity, which reveal lower level of performance, with a 
mean ranging from 3.7 for capabilities in software programming, mean of 4.3 for 
capabilities in software design, mean of 4.7 for abilities to produce high quality products and services, and mean of 4.7 for capabilities for prompt delivery. The 
performance of this sub-group affects the assessment of the overall performance of 
the exporters, and therefore, it should be noted that the low performance is due to only 
that group and is not spread among all the exporters. At this point we are not in a 
position to outline the reasons for the lower performance of that particular group, and 
further investigation of the possible reasons on the basis of case studies is to be 
undertaken. 
4.3. Further comparisons and concluding remarks about capabilities 
The analysis of the individual  capabilities reveals that Bulgarian software 
companies appear confident in all of the outlined abilities, when deployed in the 
domestic market. Nevertheless, not all companies reveal the same levels of 
accumulation of capabilities, as the standard deviation reveals (table 1). For some 
capabilities the companies reveal similar levels of accumulation, like the capabilities 
for software design and software programming. However, in the rest of the 
capabilities in the set companies’ performance deviates significantly. Standard 
deviation of (.520) emerges in the capabilities for producing high quality products and 
services, followed by high levels of deviation of (.971) and (.956) in the capabilities 
for prompt delivery and building expertise in a specialised domain respectively, and 
the highest deviation appears in the capabilities to diversify products and services 
(standard deviation of (1.173). Even greater deviation occurs with respect to 
companies’ abilities to perform in the international markets (table 1). Companies 
appear to deviate significantly in their capabilities to perform in international markets 
and this hold for all capabilities (all standard deviation coefficients range from (1.257) 
to (1.532).   If we are to summarise the results of the analysis a clear distinction emerges 
between companies’ abilities to perform in the domestic and international markets. 
Both the domestic-oriented companies and the exporters have managed to build 
capabilities to compete in the domestic market, and they appear confident in the 
whole array of skills and capabilities. Nevertheless, despite the strong performance of 
both groups in the domestic market, a slight distinction between the capabilities of the 
domestic-oriented companies and the exporters emerges, as the domestic-oriented 
companies reveal slightly lower coefficients for all capabilities than the exporters.  
This difference becomes far more noticeable when we compare the 
capabilities of the domestic-oriented companies vs. the exporters to compete in the 
international markets. While all exporters reveal strong capabilities and expertise to 
perform in the international markets, the domestic-oriented companies appear far less 
successful in developing the necessary skills, expertise and capabilities to execute 
international projects. Thus, for example, when comparing the capabilities of the 
Bulgarian companies for software engineering (e.g. software design and 
programming) and specialised expertise in the international markets, the exporters 
come up with coefficients, which are nearly twice higher the coefficients, which the 
domestic-oriented companies get. Further, for these capabilities the domestic-oriented 
companies position below the average point of the evaluation scale, i.e. by obtaining 
means below 3. 
Overall, the results of the analysis about capabilities accumulation by 
domestic-oriented vs. the exporter-driven companies reveal sharp inter-group 
differences in the level of accumulated capabilities and the abilities to compete in the 
domestic and international markets.  These results have been also supported by the results of the ANOVA test, 
comparing the accumulation of capabilities in domestic-oriented companies vs. 
exporters. The ANOVA analysis confirms that significant differences exist between 
the exporters and the domestic-oriented companies with respect to their capabilities 
for software programming for the international markets (coefficient (.000), 
capabilities for software design for the international markets (coefficient (.000), 
abilities to offer high quality products and services in  the international markets 
(coefficient (.001), and also with respect to the capability to develop specialised 
expertise in a particular domain in the international markets (coefficient (.000) (table 
3). Significant differences between the capabilities of domestic-oriented vs. exporters 
appear in the whole array of skills and abilities necessary to compete in the 
international markets and higher level of accumulation appears in all capabilities in 
the group of the exporters. In this sense, the bifurcation pattern, which the industry 
performs in its export intensity, is underpinned by a bifurcation pattern in its 
capabilities.  
 
5. External factors affecting development of indigenous software industries 
in CEE 
The results of the study reveal that a small percentage of the indigenous 
companies had managed to build capabilities to compete in international markets. 
These are companies that have managed to build cutting-edge capabilities, despite 
being embedded in a less advanced context, and this suggests that indigenous software 
development in Bulgaria has certain potential. Further, a number of domestic-oriented 
companies have managed to accumulate capabilities and develop packages for the 
domestic market. At the same time, the results of the study reveal indisputably that the 
predominant part of the indigenous software companies are not capable of competing 
in international markets. These have two implications. First, it reveals that the chances 
of the predominant part of the indigenous companies to enter the international markets 
are meagre, if any at all. Second, it suggests that a significant part of the indigenous 
companies are very likely to be seriously challenged in medium run by foreign 
competitors entering the market.  
These results come to reveal that software development based on indigenous 
resources is a challenging task in Bulgaria, and the predominant number of the 
companies is failing to develop capabilities adequate to the requirements of the 
international markets. To be able to identify the grounds for this failure and to draw 
possible policy implications, further research needs to be undertaken to explore in 
detail the learning activities at company level and to identify impediments before 
capability accumulation. Nevertheless, the above results point out an area for policy 
consideration.  
So far the policies supporting development of the ICTs, which have been 
adopted in Bulgaria, have been predominantly directed at developing the Information 
Society, after a decade in 1990es when the positive impact of public policies have 
been discarded and neo-liberal policy environment was established. In spite of their 
relevance, further and more focused policies are needed, directed at development of 
the indigenous software activities. Since 2001 some government initiatives have been 
designed to support the industry. For example, it has been outlined that the quality of 
education is to be improved, high-tech incubators have been established, and the 
government has been promoting the industry in major international expositions in 
Germany and the USA. However, some of these initiatives have been suffering major pitfalls and failed to reap significant benefits for the industry. For example, the vision 
of the ICT development agency portrayed the industry as a potential outsourcing 
destination and all initiatives and efforts in promoting and support have been 
channelled towards this end. The outsourcing potential of the industry proved to be 
low and insufficient to compete with major destinations like India, which apart from 
being more cost-effective had already developed good infrastructure, reputation and 
capabilities. A strategy placing emphasis only on the outsourcing potential had 
deprived the software developments based on indigenous resources and no resources 
and support have been allocated to these.  
The next major problem concerns the education. For more than a decade after 
the collapse of the command block there was a widespread belief in the country that 
the quality of education in computer sciences is good, following the tradition in the 
past. It is true that Bulgaria preserved very good education in mathematics (as 
mentioned above Bulgarians regularly win Olympiads in Mathematics and Bulgarians 
are among the top university students worldwide (2nd in the world in SAT scores) and 
Bulgaria ranked significantly higher than the international average in the International 
Mathematics and Science Study).  
However, the positive preconceptions about the provision of good education in 
computer sciences in Bulgaria fail to take into account the technological dynamism in 
the computer industry in the last few years and the occurring change in skills 
requirements. Until mid-1990es skills in mathematics were fundamental for computer 
engineers, but since then skills in JAVA scripts, security engineering, web design, 
database engineering, project management, etc. had become critical. As noted above, 
these fundamental technological changes in the global software industry found the 
CEE software engineers unprepared (Bitzer, 2000). Therefore, a fundamental shift in the education paradigm had to be undertaken in Bulgaria and CEE. In Bulgaria it took 
some time for the education system to re-adjust, and as a result the quality of 
education dropped. In the last two or three years due to pressure from industry 
representatives there is a positive shift, although there is still room for improvement, 
according to the view of industry representatives, depicted by the current study and in 
recent interviews by the author. However, the problem is more complex, as already 
described, and it should be tackled with complex and more innovative initiatives to 
address the whole range of problems affecting the capabilities accumulation in 
companies. 
The next factor hindering the development of the indigenous software industry 
is the low level of collaboration among companies and low level of trust. Trust in 
CEE societies has been dramatically undermined in 1990es (Amsden, 1994; 
Braguinsky, 2000; Kremeny, 1996), and this reflects in a low level of collaboration 
among companies. However, indigenous CEE companies are in general small and 
possess limited resources (be they human, financial or even expertise), which limit 
their opportunities to enter international arena and compete with own resources. 
Therefore, cooperation among companies is a critical factor in mobilising a broader 
pool of resources enabling the indigenous companies to compete internationally. So 
far, if cooperation occurs, it is driven by efforts of individual companies, and remains 
sporadic and does not develop in broader and more encompassing joint effort. The 
absence of commonly shared vision and a national base hinder the possibilities these 
contacts to create a broader platform for collaboration. A very recent attempt gives a 
base for optimism in this direction, although the initiative suffers some deficiencies. 
In May 2006 an IT cluster has been established in South Eastern Europe, involving 
Bulgaria, Romania, Macedonia, Albania, etc. A critic can point out that this regional collaboration has not been based on cohesive national vision for development of the 
Bulgarian software industry at a first place and that it does not contribute significantly 
to increase of collaboration among Bulgarian companies. Nevertheless, this initiative 
is a step forward in that direction and bears potential to create a base for further 
developments. 
Another aspect of trust is the reputation of the indigenous CEE companies and 
the trust from the international community. European accession has helped 
significantly in improving the reputation of the region and in establishing a bridge 
between the international business and CEE companies. Nevertheless, the painful 
transition in some countries, like Bulgaria for example, took its stake in retarding 
establishment of trust, and currently this process has been threatened by the education 
and capabilities gaps in software development, which appeared in the recent years. 
Therefore, the country needs to accelerate its attempts in developing software 
industry, if it is to regain its strong position. 
The existing public policies in Bulgaria fail to develop complex and focussed 
initiatives aiding in support of indigenous software activities. As Heeks (2002) points 
out, development of a latecomer software industry requires focused and combined 
efforts at several levels. Following his model, a number of missing elements can be 
identified in the existing Bulgarian public policies. At the lowest level, financial, 
R&D and technological base schemes are absent, and in addition much needs to be 
done towards creation of skilful human base. At the next levels, initiatives to improve 
cooperation among companies have been undertaken recently but much needs to be 
done to further improve these and to establish a sense of national commitment. Links 
with international industry and establishment of trust have been incubated but these 
are to be accelerated. But the primary task before the industry and an area for public concern is the issue raised by this paper – the accumulation of capabilities by the 
companies. 
Given the identified significant capabilities gaps in the indigenous software 
companies, there is an unequivocal need for the policies to place their focus on these 
and create initiatives directed at strengthening capabilities base of the indigenous 
companies to ensure their competitiveness in medium and long run. Due to the 
complexity of the problem of capabilities accumulation, the adopted policies need to 
be innovative and comprehensive, if they are to be effective. Once the indigenous 
companies improve their capability base, they will have the capacity either to continue 
their indigenous development coupled with active foreign partnerships or to plug 
themselves into global networks. However, both alternatives will be viable only if at a 
first place the indigenous companies strengthen their capabilities base at this point of 
time, and this makes the role of public policies critical.  
  
6.  Conclusions 
New positive developments in the indigenous CEE software industry have 
been depicted by this study. The fact that a number of indigenous CEE software 
companies have managed to develop standardised and customised software solutions 
on their own and had entered the international markets signals that the industry is 
entering a qualitative new phase of development. While until recently the 
development of the industry was based only on foreign technology transfer, the new 
developments reveal that alongside these a handful of indigenous CEE companies 
have developed sophisticated technological capabilities allowing them to create 
cutting-edge standardised and customised products and compete in international markets. Further, a number of domestic-oriented companies have developed 
standardised software packages for the domestic market.  
Despite their small number, these developments give some grounds for 
optimism about the potential for indigenous software developments in CEE countries. 
Pockets of indigenous software development in CEE have already gained pace and 
started to generate cutting-edge solutions on their own, which have not been depicted 
by studies so far. These pieces of evidence counter the predictions of the previous 
studies of Bitzer (2000) (and to an extent Dyker (1996)) that the indigenous CEE 
software companies are not likely to enter the segment of standardised software 
developments on the domestic and international markets. 
The challenges outlined by this study are most likely to reveal similarities in 
the whole CEE region. It is likely that capabilities gap exists, although the proportion 
of companies succeeding to catch up and proportion of those failing to do so may be 
different. The challenge, which most of the latecomer CEE software companies face, 
is to develop higher level of capabilities, which would allow them, if not to enter the 
international market, to maintain their presence in the domestic market. It may occur 
that domestic-oriented indigenous software companies in the CEE countries that are 
already EU member states are more technologically advanced than the companies in 
South East Europe, due to the greater number of MNEs and more dynamic 
technological development in the region. But at the same time, this tendency may not 
hold for all CEE member states. As already emphasised, the paper aims to raise the 
question about capabilities building in the indigenous CEE software companies but 
further research is to be undertaken to explore differences that may occur among 
CEE. Most of the indigenous CEE software companies are trapped not only in a 
capabilities trap but in a far more complex prison. The predominant number of 
companies possesses limited human and financial resources, and even expertise. Lack 
of trust and cooperation among companies weaken further the base for development 
of indigenous CEE companies. Absence or ineffective public support and a lack of 
vision and will shared by government and industry to commit to a national project 
exacerbate the situation, and limit the opportunities to spur and nurture development 
of indigenous software industries in CEE. 
Adoption of general and broad public policies aiming development of export-
oriented industry is difficult to justify in a context in which very few companies have 
managed to build capabilities respective to requirements of the international markets, 
while the majority fails to do so (at least in the Bulgarian case). It is unrealistic to 
assume that if supported by public policies CEE can produce big export-oriented 
software industry at present or near future based on indigenous resources.  At most, 
CEE software industry can generate ‘pockets’ of export-driven enterprises. The 
inception of these is already a fact and if further enhanced they can consolidate in an 
export-oriented core. 
If effective public policy is to be enforced, it should be aimed at two major 
segments in the indigenous CEE software industry. The first one includes the export-
driven companies, which had already managed to develop capabilities to compete in 
international markets and proved to possess technological potential. Public support 
will help them enhance their competitive position and can be directed at co-financing 
certification of the companies under ISO, CMM, etc, financial provisions, initiatives 
to further enhance some aspects of capabilities development, and export promotion. 
The second segment, which possesses potential for further development, includes the leading domestic companies in the higher segments in the domestic market, as they 
have accumulated capabilities to the extent of developing products on their own for 
domestic clients and making attempts to supply international clients. The public 
support for this particular group need to include measures enhancing capability 
development, financial support, certification, and promotion. To ensure effective 
implementation, public policies must be based on strict performance requirements. 
Let us return to the argument of Steinmueller (2001) about the possibilities for 
developing indigenous software industry in the latecomer context. The author 
emphasises that to be able to embark on a leapfrogging trajectory the latecomer 
companies need to develop ‘absorptive capacities’ to acquire expertise to produce and 
use the ICTs and that the new ICT infrastructure enables these developments 
(Steinmueller, 2001, p. 197). 
The results of our analysis reveal that a modest number of Bulgarian software 
companies have been able to build capabilities to compete in the international 
markets, whereas the predominant number of the companies acknowledges that the 
capabilities, which they have accumulated, are insufficient to allow them to compete 
in the global arena. Although these results need to be augmented by further research 
exploring the underlying learning process and development of absorptive capacities in 
the domestic-oriented companies, they nevertheless reveal that development of 
indigenous software industries is a challenge in the latecomer context. Despite their 
sixteen years experience and inheritance of some capabilities from the past, the 
domestic-oriented Bulgarian software companies are failing to develop capabilities to 
compete in the international markets. Development of absorptive capacities in the 
latecomers appears to be far more challenging task than predicted. Further, as pointed 
by Heeks (2002) development of an indigenous software industry requires focused and combined efforts at several levels. If these are absent or ineffective, as the case of 
Bulgaria reveals, they undermine (or at least do not facilitate) capabilities 
accumulation.  
Developing absorptive capacities for software production in a latecomer 
context is a daunting task, as the latecomer companies face a variety of deficiencies. 
These arise from the low capability base on which they begin to build capabilities and 
also from the external environment, like poor or inadequate education, absent or 
inefficient public policy support, limited finance and R&D, lack of cooperation and 
trust, etc. In this sense, the optimistic forecasts about the possibilities for leapfrogging 
by the latecomer countries by developing indigenous software industries have been 
overestimated. This is not to contest the optimism about the potential of the latecomer 
companies to develop mastery over new technologies and eventually to generate new 
technologies, but rather to suggest that it is most likely that a limited number of 
latecomer companies will be able to develop leading-edge capabilities. Perhaps 
latecomer countries like India, China and Brazil, which have been able to mobilise 
their potential in harnessing the benefits from the ICTs, present optimistic examples 
(despite the fact that the software industries in China and Brazil remain predominantly 
domestic-market oriented, the domestic demand is sophisticated, as it is represented 
by MNEs). Whether other cases would provide grounds for optimism or rather the 
experience of the rest of the latecomers would provide evidence for a counter 
argument, is still to be seen. The case of the Bulgarian software industry itself 
presents a case for moderate optimism. It is optimistic that a group of companies, 
although representing a relatively small share in the industry, has managed to enter 
and compete in the international markets. Nevertheless, the questions remain whether 
some of the domestic-oriented companies will be able to make a shift to the international markets and how sustainable the development of the domestic-oriented 
companies will be in the future.   
This paper needs to be complemented by further research in two directions. 
The analysis in this paper was focussed on the core capabilities for software 
production. Other capabilities, like organisational capabilities, may also exercise an 
impact on the capacity of organisation to develop absorptive capacities and to 
compete. Therefore, first direction of research is to expand the analysis of capabilities 
and include organisational capabilities. A framework for this comprehensive analysis 
taking into account the main capabilities, which the latecomer software companies 
need to muster, is developed in Rousseva (2006). The second direction of research is 
to disentangle the underlying learning processes and development of absorptive 
capacities, which will allow us to detect any differences, which underpin the different 
patterns of capabilities accumulation. By augmenting the results of this study with 
these two further directions of research the analysis will have a better potential to 
identify the difficulties in developing absorptive capacities and to contribute to the 
debate about possibilities for developing indigenous software industries in a latecomer 
context. Potential third direction of research and with respect to development of ICTs 
industries only in some of the CEE countries in the past, it may be appealing to 
explore the differences in accumulation patterns and whether these are anyhow related 
to previous experience or current developments appear completely independent from 
existence of previous experience. This further direction of research may explore not 
simply past experience-dependence but also the variety of factors, which enhance or 
hinder indigenous software developments.  
This paper opens up a more general enquiry about the potential of indigenous 
technological development in CEE: whether ‘pockets’ of indigenous companies in CEE have managed to accumulate capabilities and go beyond the stage of foreign 
technological transfer and begin to develop technologies on their own, and this 
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